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tive productivity effects, apart from wbat
I believe are modest contributions from
reduced turnover and grievance proce-
dures. Rather, it is the expectation of lower
profits resulting from higher union wages
and benefits that makes it necessary for
firms in relatively competitive environ-
ments to increase monitoring, improve
managerial structures, and the like (in other
words, the traditional "shock" effect of
unions).
Whether one believes unionism in those
settings is beneficial to the economy
depends crucially on one's assumptions. To
the extent that one believes that slack (or
"X inefficiency") and long-run rents accru-
ing to capital are widely prevalent in the
U.S. economy, the union effect may be
largely benign. I suspect, however, that the
significant union effect on profitability,
even if restricted to Brms with some market
power, is likely to decrease long-run invest-
ment in long-lived capital and research and
development, and to decrease long-run
productivity growth. (Hirsch and Connolly
[1984] find, for example, that unionism
lowers the market valuation of R and D
investments and decreases firms' R and D
intensity.) Welfare losses associated with
such effects are likely to be larger than the
modest static efficiency losses resulting from
union wage increases. Questions concerning
the long-run dynamic effects of union rent-
seeking clearly warrant continued study.
Even with these reservations, I must con-
clude that the F & M research program has
significantly enhanced our knowledge and
understanding of unionism. Although final
evaluation of this literature must await fur-
ther study, I suspect that most of the find-
ings and conclusions in What Do Unions Do?
will stand the test of time.
Comment by David B. Lipsky*
In What Do Unions Do?, F & M gather
together an impressive amount of evidence
showing that unions are on net beneficial
for society. This book will not end the
debate over whether unions are good or
*David B. Lipsky is a Professor at the New York.
State School of Industrial and Labor Relations, Cor-
nell University.
bad for society, but it represents a mile-
stone that will surely influence the course
of the debate in the future.
As almost all readers of the Review must
now know, E & M believe that unions have
two "faces." At one and the same time, the
authors maintain, unions exercise monop-
oly power and serve as a mechanism that
provides workers with "collective voice." On
the basis of their findings, the authors judge
the deleterious consequences of union
monopoly power to be outweighed by the
beneficial effects of collective voice, thereby
tipping the social balance sheet in favor of
unions. For many neoclassical economists,
this assessment has been a hard nut to swal-
low. But for many of us in the industrial
relations tradition, F & M's findings have
complemented our own research. Modern
industrial relations scholars, heirs of the
Webbs, Commons, and Perlman tradition,
have not been uncritical of unions but have.
concluded that, at their best, unions make
a positive contribution to the general wel-
fare. Orthodox economists, on the other
hand, have not often given industrial rela-
tions scholars a respectful hearing. By
speaking to their fellow economists in their
own language, Ereeman and Medoff have
provided those of us in industrial relations
with the effective "voice" we have all too
often lacked with the economics profession.
F & M's methodology is a familiar one to
social scientists. In most of the chapters of
this book, the authors consider the effect
of unionism on some "outcome," such as
the wages ofunion members, the wages of
nonunion workers, fringe benefits, wage
differentials, quits and layoffs, productiv-
ity, and profits. Each outcome measure is
used as the dependent variable in a regres-
sion model that includes some measure of
unionism. One's faith in the validity of the
authors' conclusions is, in most cases, but-
tressed by the thoroughness of their tests,
the breadth of their choice of samples and
model specifications, and their willingness
to acknowledge anomalous findings. For
many of the outcome measures, particu-
larly wages, fringes, and turnover, the find-
ings are very robust and can hardly be
doubted. In other cases, such as produc-
tivity and profits, their findings are much
more tenuous and require further testing.
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There is no gainsaying the power of
E & M's methodology, but most social sci-
entists also recognize its limitations. I need
not spell out all of them here, but I would
like to make note ofa few I Bnd particularly
troublesome. Essentially, E & M arrive at
their conclusions by comparing union
workers with nonunion workers, or union-
ized establishments with nonunion estab-
lishments. Unionism in their scheme of
analysis remains an abstraction: one union
is like every other union, one collective bar-
gaining relationship like all the rest. Even
industrial relations scholars (including this
reviewer) have frequently relied on the
same approach, and fellow sinners should
be reluctant to cast stones. But it would
certainly advance our understanding of
what unions do if we moved away from
undifferentiated measures of unionism and
began to incorporate, into our statistical
analysis, measures that capture the various
forms in which unionism and collective
bargaining appear. The authors devote a
scant three pages to the structure of col-
lective bargaining, for example, but it is
likely that bargaining structures have an
independent influence on outcomes. Only
a handful of data-based studies have exam-
ined that influence.
Indeed, E & M's approach fails to account
for the influence on outcomes of a host of
factors that industrial relations scholars
believe to be important, such as the history
of the parties and their relationships; the
customs and traditions of the work site; the
personalities, attitudes, and leadership skills
of the actors; the negotiating strategies and
tactics used by the parties; the degree of
inter- and intra-organizational conflict; and
the availability of various dispute resolu-
tion procedures. Because industrial rela-
tions scholars have recognized that these
factors have an independent effect on bar-
gaining outcomes, they have increasingly
moved away from models that assume out-
comes are a function simply of exogenous
economic and demographic variables and
toward more complex models often based
on a systems paradigm. Although systems
models have their own problems, it is worth
pondering whether we can really under-
stand what unions do if we ignore orga-
nizational and behavioral factors that are
an important source of variation in
outcomes.
Another limitation is the highly static
nature of E & M's analysis, which relies
heavily on cross-sectional testing of data sets
assembled in the 1960s and 1970s. The
authors' findings may tell us less about what
unions currently do than about what unions
did during an era that is now history. E & M
use the most suitable data sets available to
them, but the issue is whether a snapshot
of union effects in the 1960s and 1970s
remains an accurate picture of the conse-
quences of unionism in the 1980s. Many
industrial relations scholars believe that
collective bargaining has recently been
moving through a period of historic trans-
formation in the United States.** By con-
trast, E & M dismiss the idea that we have
entered a new era in industrial relations,
arguing that the recent wave of conces-
sionary agreements has merely served to
return union wage premiums to more nor-
mal levels.
I believe that the signs of major change
are too abundant to be ignored. One sign
is the precipitous drop of union member-
ship in many sectors of the economy. E & M
do examine the "slow strangulation of
private-sector unions," noting that the con-
tinuation of current trends portends a
"disastrous decline" in the level of union-
ization to a bare 10 percent of the non-
agricultural labor force before the end of
the century. The authors attribute the
drastic contraction of the labor movement
primarily to legal and illegal management
opposition, which they say has increased by
"leaps and bounds," and to the ineffective-
ness of government policies designed to
regulate such conduct. They minimize the
responsibility of the unions for their own
misfortunes, perhaps because union
organizing efforts are so difficult to
quantify.
They largely ignore the effects of
heightened international competition,
technological change, government dere-
gulation, and a conservative political cli-
mate on union organizing and labor
"For two recent articles that make this case, see
Strauss (1984) and Kochan, McKersie, and Cappelli
(1984).
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relations. They also seem impervious to the
fact that collective bargaining has become
substantially more decentralized in the wake
of the collapse of industrywide agree-
ments, the abandonment of pattern bar-
gaining, the movement to two-tiered wage
contracts, and other structural changes. If,
in fact, we have moved into a new era, the
kind of static analysis used by F & M pro-
vides us with only a limited understanding
of the dynamic forces now reshaping
American labor relations. The larger ques-
tion is whether an enfeebled union move-
ment can have the same influence in the
future as it had in the past.
The collective voice—institutional response
model represents a useful framework for
understanding certain aspects of unionism,
but it does not constitute a full-blown the-
ory of union behavior and effects. It rests
heavily on the assumption that nonunion
employers respond to the needs of the mar-
ginal worker—younger, more mobile
employees—while union employers are
forced to consider the needs of the infra-
marginal, median worker—more senior,
less mobile employees. "In a unionized set-
ting . . . the union takes accountof a//work-
ers in determining its demands at the
bargaining table, so that the desires of
workers who are highly unlikely to leave
the enterprise are also represented,"
according to the authors. But they merely
assert rather than demonstrate this view.
Its validity depends on whether the median-
voter model represents an accurate depic-
tion of the internal political process of
unions. F & M ignore ample evidence in
the industrial relations literature that some
unions—many fear too large a number—
fail to measure up to the democratic model
and are instead dominated by an oligarchic
leadership or an entrenched bureaucracy.
F & M do examine some indicators of
union democracy and conclude that there
"is a great deal of democracy . . . through-
out the labor movement, particularly at
the local union level." But their case is not
particularly persuasive, resting on imper-
fect indicia such as union constitutional
provision, membership attitudes, the turn-
over of union leaders, charges of improper
conduct brought under the Landrum-
Griffin Act, and a limited number of case
studies conducted by other scholars. The
authors simply do not confront this impor-
tant issue with the same care and diligence
they use in their analysis of unions' eco-
nomic effects. But if unions are not the
democracies F & M believe them to be, their
contention that collective voice "funda-
mentally alters the operation of a labor
market and, hence, the nature of the labor
contract," producing more socially optimal
outcomes, fails to have credibility.
The authors are surprisingly uncritical
of the view that unions do have a monopoly
face. To them, whether unions are pri-
marily monopolistic or primarily voice
institutions is entirely an empirical ques-
tion. In my judgment, however, the utility
of considering unions as monopolies is more
than an empirical question: it is a critical
conceptual and theoretical issue. At best,
the monopoly model of unions is a useful
metaphor; at worst, it is an utter distortion
of the nature of unionism.
Clearly, unions are not literally mono-
polies: to cite only a few of the well-known
flaws of the monopoly model, unions can-
not be monopolies because they do not
actually sell the services of their members;
they are not profit maximizers (nor is it
evident that they engage in any form of
maximizing behavior); they lack meaning-
ful cost functions; they do not (in the
absence of the closed shop) control the sup-
ply of labor; and as F & M themselves
emphasize, they adhere to the precept of
the standard wage rather than engaging in
price (wage) discrimination, as true mon-
opolies do.'' By uncritically accepting the
theoretical possibility that unions' monop-
oly effects may, under some circumstances,
outweigh their voice effects, F & M actually
grant that the weight of empirical evidence
may yet prove them wrong. This stance
should give pause to union advocates who
have greeted their research with unquali-
fied praise.
On the other hand, the authors are so
intent on making the best possible case for
the social utility of unionism that even the
most ardent union supporters ought to
°For a criticism of the monopoly view of unionism,
see Mishel (N.d.).
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blanch a bit at their efforts. In examining
unions' economic effects, they rest their case
on a thorough analysis of masses of data;
but in dealing with such issues as union
democracy, corruption, and political inBu-
ence, the authors too often rely on incom-
plete or imperfect evidence. They conclude,
for example, that "the amount of union
corruption is no more than, and probably
less than, business corruption," basing this
conclusion largely on Department of Labor
reports on criminal convictions under the
Landrum-Griffin Act and the Hobbes Act,
clearly imperfect indices of the extent of
union crime. E & M are probably right
about union corruption, but one wishes they
had based their argument on sturdier
evidence.
I also wish that such an important book
contained more graceful prose and that the
editors had corrected the numerous typo-
graphical errors that assault the reader's
eye. (To note only two examples, Daniel
Mitchell's important book is consistently
called Union Wages and Inflation, rather than
Unions, Wages, and Inflation, and this jour-
nal is sometimes cited as the Industrial Labor
Relations Review.) Nevertheless, What do
Unions Do? should be required reading for
all students of labor economics and indus-
trial relations. By providing readers with
the most comprehensive survey to date of
empirical evidence on unions' economic
effects, it serves as an effective antidote to
the view that unions have only harmful
consequences. At the same time, its
dependence on static economic models and
methods reminds us that we need more
comprehensive, integrated theories if we
are ever to understand what unions actually
do.
Comment by Daniel J. B. Mitchell*
What Do Unions Do? is a landmark in social
science research. E & M have culled con-
clusions about unions from a vast array of
data sets, surveys, and articles and
expressed them in a fashion accessible to
most readers. It is hard to imagine any
course in labor economics that would not
include readings from this book. Because
the authors' contribution is so obvious, I
will concentrate on the few deficiencies and
omissions in the volume.
One deficiency is a lack of analysis of
bargaining. The outcomes of that process
are analyzed, but the process itself is barely
mentioned. Strikes are discussed only to
show that their social cost is low. Yet the
threat of a strike is precisely what extracts
the various concessions from management
that E & M document. Since bargaining is
neglected, management motives—other
than merely wanting to pay less—are also
neglected. Related to this omission is the
neglect of determinants of wage-change.
If there is a secret villain in the E & M
study, it is the old Gregg Lewis approach
in Unionism and Relative Wages in the United
States (1963). Although E & M politely refer
to Lewis's book as "inBuential" (p. 44), they
view his wage-centered "monopoly" model
as excessively narrow. Yet there is more life
in the traditional model than E & M believe,
if that model is expanded to include bar-
gaining strategy and some of the authors'
own insights. One can agree with the need
to avoid a narrow focus, without having to
jump to E & M's "voice" model, which ulti-
mately adds little to their analysis.'"
The traditional model, when combined
with the median-voter approach favored
by E & M, explains much of what they
observe. Since unions possess the strike
threat, they can extract concessions from
management. And, since unions are con-
trolled by senior workers, they tilt the pay
package toward those workers. There is no
need for a voice model to explain the bias
toward tenure-related fringes found by
E&M.
The authors stress the importance of the
noncompensation aspects of unionized
workplaces, such as workrules and partic-
*Daniel J. B. Mitchell is the Director of the Institute
of Industrial Relations, and Professor in the Graduate
School of Managetnent at the University of California
at Los Angeles.
In this review, I substitute the phrase "traditional
model" for "monopoly model" to avoid the pejorative
connotation of the latter. The prettier term "wage
improvement" model could just as well have been used.
I follow F & M's use of the term "voice" with its nor-
mative implication. (Who would want to be accused
of stifling someone's voice?) The more negative term
"vested influence" could have been substituted.
